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II.2. The relationship between government 
and export sector wages and 
implications for competitiveness (26) 
In 2012, the general government sector employed 
on average about 15% of the labour force in the 
euro area. Since most countries in the euro area 
are now trying to consolidate public finances, 
whilst also trying to boost competitiveness for 
external rebalancing and to reduce unemployment, 
it is crucial to assess whether there is any wage 
spillover from the public to the export sector, in 
particular under conditions of fiscal stress. This 
section shows that there has been a link between 
government and manufacturing wages over the 
long-run, which is much closer when the 
government employs a large share of the labour 
force. Government size dimension is especially 
important during fiscal consolidation. If the 
government wage bill is inflated due to unjustified 
wage premia for example, limiting government 
wage growth is a fiscal strategy that may, among 
other effects, deliver competitiveness gains that 
contribute to external rebalancing and help boost 
employment in the tradable sector.  
----------------------- 
Introduction 
General government employment accounts for a 
considerable share of the labour force in the euro 
area. It stood at about 15 % in 2012, with but some 
cross-country variation. The evolution of 
government wages is likely to have an impact not 
only on fiscal variables and on the sustainability of 
public finances, but also on the labour market, on 
cost competitiveness and on external rebalancing 
within the euro area. This section looks at the 
relationship between public and private sector 
wages, at a time when most euro area countries are 
trying to consolidate their public finances, improve 
competitiveness to support external rebalancing, 
whilst also having to tackle high unemployment 
levels. (27) 
Changes in general government compensations 
may spill over into the private sector through both 
(26) Section prepared by Benedicta Marzinotto and Alessandro 
Turrini. 
(27) Throughout the section, the public sector is referred to alongside 
general government, which refers to public offices at all levels of 
government, non-market public owned hospitals, schools, and 
social security organizations. Thus, the term "public" is used as a 
synonym for general government.  
market-based and institutional channels. For 
example, excessive government wages may crowd 
out private sector employment, inflating cost 
conditions and leading to competitiveness 
losses. (28) There are channels of transmission also 
in the opposite direction, from the private to the 
government sector. Wage growth linked to 
productivity improvements in the private sector 
can spill over into the public if there is labour 
mobility across sectors. This can affect 
governments' capacity to keep wage expenditure 
growth under control.  
Against this background, this section analyses the 
relationship between general government and 
manufacturing wages, in order to assess the 
potential for and conditions of a wage spillover 
from the insulated government sector to the export 
sector. The relationship is analysed by looking at a 
sample of EU countries over the period 1980-2013 
in a co-integration framework that makes it 
possible to distinguish between long-run and short-
run effects. The relationship between the two 
wages is also assessed for different fiscal scenarios, 
differentiating between normal periods and periods 
of fiscal adjustment.  
The various forms the relationship takes  
The relationship between public and private wages 
takes many forms. It may be influenced by market 
forces and/or by institutional features of the wage 
setting system in each country. Changes in private 
wages can affect government wage growth in the 
following ways: 
• Wage bargaining in the private sector has a
demonstration effect on public wage-setters.
Perez and Sanchez (2011) find evidence of
signalling by the private sector in the
negotiation phase in France and Germany
before the EMU period. (29) Signalling may be
motivated by envy effects that reflect the
strength of the wage-bargaining position (30) or
(28) See for example Alesina, A. and R. Perotti, (1997), "The welfare 
state and competitiveness", American Economic Review, Vol. 87, 
pp. 921-939. Alesina A., Ardagna S., Perotti R. and Schiantarelli 
F., (2002), "Fiscal policy, profits, and investment", American 
Economic Review, Vol. 92(3), pp. 571-589. Ardagna, S., (2004), 
"Fiscal stabilizations: when do they work and why", European 
Economic Review, Vol. 48, pp. 1047-1074. 
(29) Perez, J.J. and A.J. Sanchez, (2011), "Is there a signalling role for 
public wages? Evidence of the euro area based on macro data", 
Empirical Economics, Vol. 41(2), pp. 421-445. 
(30) Maffezzoli, M., (2001), "Non-Walrasian labor markets and real 
business cycles", Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 4(4), pp. 860-
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by the fact that the same trade union negotiates 
wages for both sectors.  
• Wage-bargaining practices may explicitly or 
implicitly grant wage leadership to the private 
sector. Under the Scandinavian wage-setting 
model, the private export sector typically takes 
the lead, dictating bargaining outcomes to other 
sectors, including the public sector. (31)  
• There may also be established practices and 
institutional mechanisms that make public 
wages responsive to private wage settlements, 
usually those of the export sector. This is the 
case if for example there is a formal rule under 
which the growth rate of private wages is 
automatically applied to public sector wages. (32)  
It is of course a two-way street. Changes in 
government wages affect private wage growth in a 
number of ways: 
• Wage adjustment in the public sector causes 
cross-sector labour shifts and a change in the 
private sector's labour supply. As the supply of 
labour changes, so does the competitive private 
sector's equilibrium wage. 
• Adjustments to government wages affect the 
outside option of unionised private sector 
bargainers, putting pressures on the bargaining 
process (33) with, for example, private sector 
workers tempted to move to the general 
government sector due to large public wage 
increases.  
                                                                                 
892. Ardagna S., (2007), "Fiscal policy in unionized labor 
markets", Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 31(5), pp. 
1498-1534. 
(31) For a review, see Lindquist, J. and R. Vilhemsson, (2006), "Is the 
Swedish central government a wage leader?", Applied Economics, 
Vol. 38, pp. 1617-1625. Friberg, K., (2007), "Intersectoral wage 
linkages: the case of Sweden", Empirical Economics, Vol. 32, 
pp. 161-184. Traxler, F. and B. Brandl, (2012), "Collective 
bargaining, inter-sectoral heterogeneity and competitiveness: a 
cross-national comparison of macroeconomic performance", 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 50(1), pp. 73-98. 
Ramskloger, P., (2012), "Is there a European wage leader? Wage 
spillovers in the European Monetary Union", Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 36(4), pp. 941-962; and (2013), "The national–
transnational wage-setting nexus in Europe: What have we 
learned from the early years of monetary integration?", Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 51(5), pp. 916-930. 
(32) For evidence on the Netherlands, see Hartog, J. and H. 
Oosterbeek, (1993), "Public and private sector wages in the 
Netherlands", European Economic Review, Vol. 37(1), pp. 97-114. 
(33) Afonso, A. and P. Gomes, (2008), "Interactions between   private 
and public sector wages", ECB Working Paper No. 971. 
• Changes in public wages may be fully 
compensated in government budgets by 
changes in labour taxation that alter labour 
costs in the private sector (34) and might also 
affect union behaviour. (35) 
Co-movements between government and private 
wages may also take place in the absence of direct 
links, when driven by factors common to both 
sectors. For example, public wages may be pro-
cyclical and change in a manner similar to private 
wages over the cycle. (36) Co-movements in 
aggregate wage series could be linked to 
developments common to both factors, relating to 
the composition of the labour force.  
Testing the relationship between government 
and manufacturing wages 
To analyse more systematically the long- and short-
term effects of government wages on the export 
sector, a cointegration approach is used linking 
manufacturing compensations to a number of 
determinants, including compensation in the 
government sector. The long-term relationship is 
analysed in terms of levels, while the Error 
Correction Mechanism (ECM) equation makes it 
possible to estimate the short-term relation 
between export sector wage growth, shocks in 
explanatory variables, and their deviation from the 
long-term relationship. The long-term relationship 
in also analysed in terms of levels using a dynamic 
ordinary least squares (DOLS) model, and the 
results incorporated in an ECM model. 
Estimates were made on a sample of 17 EU 
countries for which data are available over the 
period 1980-2013. This has not only has the 
advantage of gaining degrees of freedom and 
reinforcing the results. It also makes it possible to 
                                                     
(34) Holmlund, B., (1993), "Wage setting in private and public sectors 
in a model with endogenous government behaviour", European 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 9(2), pp. 149-162. 
(35) The spillover from the public to the private sector is likely to be 
mediated by the structure of wage-setting systems. Alesina and 
Perotti (1997) find that increases in labour taxation do not 
necessarily lead to higher wage demands by unions in highly 
centralised bargaining systems, as large wage setters would 
internalise the consequences from higher labour costs on 
employment. 
(36) For instance, Lane (2003) and Lamo et al (2007) find that public 
wages are pro-cyclical because of discretionary fiscal expansion in 
good times. Lane, P., (2003), "The cyclical behaviour of fiscal 
policy: evidence from the OECD, in: Journal of Public Economics, 
Vol. 87, pp. 2661-2675. Lamo, A., Perez J.J., Schuknecht L., 
(2007), "The cyclicality of consumption, wages and employment 
of the public sector in the euro area", ECB Working Paper No. 757. 
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investigate the role of framework conditions in 
bringing the impact of general government to bear 
on manufacturing wages by means of appropriate 
sample splits. Box II.2.1 shows the estimation 
methodology and the results.  
Much of the variance in manufacturing wages is 
explained by variables usually used when estimating 
wage equations (i.e., the price level, labour 
productivity, and the unemployment rate) and by 
general government wage levels. Both the long- 
and short-term elasticity of manufacturing wages 
with respect to government wages is estimated to 
be around 0.3-0.4. This tallies with the results of 
similar studies (e.g., Afonso and Gomes, 2008). It 
works both ways: general government wages also 
react to manufacturing wages. They have a long-
term elasticity of 0.8 and a short-term elasticity of 
0.4. (37) This is consistent with the fact that it is 
more usual for the private sector than for the 
government to take the lead in terms of wages, as 
the available literature also shows. (38). The DOLS 
cointegration estimation delivers qualitatively 
identical results. The results are still valid when the 
sample is restricted to just the euro area. (39) The 
relationship tested on real wages is symmetrical, 
because manufacturing wages respond to 
government wages, whether they are increased or 
reduced. 
One hypothesis tested here is whether the size of 
the government sector determines the extent to 
which changes to government wages affect average 
conditions on the private market if for example 
there is cross-sector mobility. In order to test how 
this market-based channel works, the same EU 
sample is split into two groups of countries: those 
in which the average share of government to total 
employment is above the whole EU sample’s 
median and countries in which it is below the 
median. Results show that, in the long-run, the 
impact of public on manufacturing wages is 
considerably higher in the case of large public 
sectors. This divide disappears in the short-run. In 
the opposite direction going from manufacturing 
to public wages, the split does not produce 
differentiated results. This confirms that 
government size matters when it comes to the 
public sector's long-term impact on the labour 
(37) The results are not shown. 
(38) Perez, J.J. and A.J. Sanchez, (2011). 
(39) Still, it should be noted that the sample used excludes some key 
countries in the euro area. 
market. The DOLS methodology confirms these 
results. (40)  
Another hypothesis that is tested is whether the 
way wages are set in the public sector increases the 
chances of manufacturing wages reacting to 
government wages. Broadly speaking, two wage-
setting systems may be identified: 
• This first is that wages are mainly set on the
basis of collective bargaining.
• The second is that wages are set on the basis of
unilateral decision by the government. (41)
The results show that the way wages are set does 
not fundamentally alter the relation between 
government and manufacturing wages in the long- 
or the short-term. It is however interesting to note 
that across all methodologies used, the relationship 
between manufacturing wages and labour 
productivity is weaker in countries characterised by 
a "unilateral decision" wage-setting system. This is 
probably because in such a case the spillover from 
public to private wages is such that private wages 
tend to be misaligned with sectoral productivity. 
This is not the case when government wages are 
set through a "collective bargaining" wage-setting 
system, possibly because bargaining processes, 
even in a particular type of insulated sector such as 
the public one, reflect market forces more than a 
unilateral government decision.  
The relationship between government and 
manufacturing wages under fiscal stress  
Most countries in the euro area have recently been 
trying to cut government wage bills, by freezing 
wages, cutting or retrenching specific indemnities 
or benefits (including bonuses and/or holidays), or 
blocking turnover. As a result, the share of 
government compensations in total government 
spending has fallen. Between 2008 and 2012, this 
fall was particularly sharp for Latvia, Portugal, and 
Romania, followed by Hungary, Spain, Denmark, 
and Estonia (Graph II.2.1). 
(40) The results from the DOLS are not shown. 
(41) For a classification of EU wage-setting systems in the government 
sector, see European Commission, Directorate for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (2014), "Government wages, and labour market 
outcomes", Occasional Paper, forthcoming. 
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Box (continued) 
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The recent crisis marked a watershed in the 
evolution of public compensations. Between 1999 
and 2007, relative government wage growth did not 
vary from "cold-shower" periods (or periods of 
more gradual fiscal consolidation) to periods of 
non-consolidation. (42)  
Graph II.2.1: Change in the share of 
general government compensations to 
total spending 
(2008-2012, in p.p.) 
Source: DG ECFIN calculations based on AMECO. 
Conversely, starting with the 2008-2009 crisis, 
compensations per employee in the government 
sector grew more slowly compared with those in 
the manufacturing sector, and more clearly so 
during fiscal consolidation (Graph II.2.2).  
It is possible that, under conditions of fiscal stress, 
the relationship between government and export 
sector wages differs from that of normal periods. 
This aspect has been neglected in previous 
analyses. To shed some light on it, Table II.2.1 
shows the correlation between government wage 
growth and manufacturing wage growth under 
alternative fiscal conditions (consolidation and 
non-consolidation), differentiating between 
countries with large and small public sectors. The 
evidence shows that the two wages are closely 
related in periods of fiscal stress only if the 
government employs a large share of the labour 
forces. This suggests that the possibility of 
(42) By convention, episodes of fiscal consolidation are defined as 
those during which the structural primary balance improves by at 
least 1.5 per cent of GDP in one year or at least 3 per cent in 
three years, with a minimum improvement of 0.5 per cent in each 
year. Such a definition makes it possible to distinguish between 
cases of "cold-shower" consolidation episodes and more gradual 
consolidation episodes. 
expenditure-based fiscal consolidation having the 
type of supply-side effects described in Alesina and 
Perotti (1997), Alesina et al (2002) and Ardagna 
(2004) may be a consequence of the size of the 
public sector, among other things. 
Graph II.2.2: Government and 
manufacturing compensations under 
alternative fiscal conditions, EU countries 
(1999-2007 and 2008-2012, avg. annual % change) 
Source: DG ECFIN calculations based on OECD. 
Table II.2.1: Correlation between 
government and manufacturing 
compensations' growth under alternative 
fiscal conditions, EU (1) 
(1) Pearson correlation coefficients. Sample: EU countries 
(excluding AT, BG, CY, DE, EL, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI) over 
1980-2012 (1995-2012 in the case of CZ, EE, HU, SK). 
Source: DG ECFIN calculations based on OECD. 
Concluding remarks 
Spillovers which are the result of high wages in the 
general government sector have been mentioned as 
one of the drivers of competitiveness losses in 
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some countries in the euro area before the 
crisis. (43)  
The results presented here speak to this debate and 
may be summarised as follows. Government wage 
levels have a long-term impact on wages in the 
manufacturing sector, even more so in countries in 
which the government sector employs a relatively 
large share of the labour force. That said, their 
short-term impact remains unaffected by the size 
of the public sector. Looking at it the other way 
round, manufacturing wages usually have a greater 
impact on government wages, regardless of size. 
This is arguably because private sector wage 
leadership is more common than public sector 


















                                                     
(43) Blanchard, O., (2007), "Adjustment within the euro. The difficult 
case of Portugal", in: Portuguese Economic Journal, 6/1, 1-21 
The way government wages are set also plays a 
role. In collective bargaining systems, not only are 
government and manufacturing wages related in 
both the long- and the short-term (as they are also 
when the government sets wages by unilateral 
decision). Also, most importantly, wages in the 
tradable sector are better aligned with labour 
productivity. The evidence provided here indicates 
that, if the government wage bill is inflated, for 
example due to unjustified wage premia, limiting 
public wage growth would spill over into the 
private export sector reducing labour costs and 
helping boost competitiveness and employment in 
the sector. Whilst structural reforms including skill 
upgrading in manufacturing are an important and 
necessary ingredient for achieving non-reversible 
gains in competitiveness, the adjustment of 
competitiveness through fiscal policy remains a 
complementary tool to deliver sustained external 
rebalancing.  
 
